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Where Were the Bank Regulators? PDF Print E-mail
Written by Pat Norton   
Thursday, 10 April 2008 01:11

In testimony before Congress last week SEC Chair Christopher Cox contended that the Securities and Exchange Commission was on top of the Bear Stearns problem at every step of the way toward Bear’s takeover by JPMorgan Chase. At no point, Cox said, did the investment bank’s reserves fall below what the regulations required, meaning that there was never an occasion for the SEC to intervene.

As to Bear’s demise, Cox argued that when there is a silent run on a bank, no amount of reserves will suffice. The rebuttal, of course, is that when reserves are perceived as truly adequate there will be no run on the bank.

Bear Stearns' Stock Price

What seems clear is that regulators, both public and private, have failed to monitor and control the U.S. financial system’s excesses. Financial regulation occurs not only through the Fed and the SEC (and other government entities), but also through private-sector rule-makers such as the stock and commodity exchanges and the bond rating agencies. The sub-prime mortgage difficulties of the past year seem to indicate a system-wide regulatory failure, raising the likelihood of bank bailouts at taxpayers’ expense.

What accounts for this apparent break-down in supervision? In a paper about to be presented at Cambridge University in a conference on financial regulation, Professor Edward J. Kane of Boston College links weak regulation in the U.S. to financial globalization.

Kane suggests that U.S. regulators turned a blind eye to the dramatic deterioration in recent lending practices because they feared foreign “regulatory competition.” The premise is that financial institutions can to some extent shop around for the regulatory regime that would benefit them most, in part by setting up off-shore affiliates in more permissive locations.

As a result, two reinforcing regulatory failures would pave the way to the subprime meltdown.

First, regulators put too much trust in the risk evaluations assigned by the bond ratings agencies—Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. In practice, such “insider ratings” proved much too sunny, partly because the raters themselves were in on the gold rush, while it lasted.

Second, the risky new securities banks sponsored became, in effect, invisible. Once banks and their affiliates “securitized” sub-prime mortgages and bundled them into so-called collateralized debt obligations, the banks were allowed to park such CDOs in structured investment vehicles (SIVs) off the banks’ balance sheets, out of sight of the regulators. Yet the banks remained “responsible” for the CDOs. In short, some large banks (think Citigroup or, in the U.K., Northern Rock) had incurred much more risk than met the eye.

Was all this a one-time derailment or a recurring episode in the history of financial regulation? Kane makes a strong case for the latter view. One of his tables, simplified here, posits five stages in a common scenario of financial crises in which regulation (and government-subsidized lending to favored political sectors) play a causal role.

Five Stages of a Regulation-Induced Banking Crisis

  1. Loss exposures increase at highly leveraged banks, who then seek safety-net subsidies tied to government promoted forms of lending (e.g., U.S. housing).

  2. When problems upset financial markets, banks and regulators allow losses to be hidden by resorting to accounting trickery on bank balance sheets.

  3. Stress is placed on traditional safety-net support mechanisms, leading to calls for public intervention and bailouts.

  4. Public bailouts leave Zombie Banks (insolvent but open, as in Japan) and no real solutions.

  5. The mess gets cleaned up, through bank closures and new banking rules.

Source: Adapted from Edward J. Kane, “Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Perspective,” April 2008, Figure One.

What remains to be seen is how the current subprime debacle will play out in the U.S. Will there be temporizing (Stage 4) or a more effective clean-up (Stage 5), as happened in the savings and loan crisis in the early 1990s? How many more shaky securities will the Fed take off the hands of private banks? And how much will that cost American taxpayers?

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Comments (3)
Response on Zombie banks and regulatory laxity
3 Monday, 28 April 2008 20:35
???
Kane wanted to concentrate on the regulatory issue. Monetary laxity did not help things, but margin/reserves non-feasance tend to stimulate reckless behavior in financial markets. When you compound the non-feasance with non-examination, you really get some good monetary rot into the banking system. To the extent that bank credit is a substitute for money, then the regulatory situation just described exacerbates monetary policy laxity.

Zombie banks are the "living dead," meaning that they are already insolvent (dead) in a market-value sense. But the dead feed off the living (note the behavior of zombies). In banking, that means, for example, zombie banks offering higher rates for deposits than non-zombies. In doing so, the zombies drive up the cost of doing business for everybody, living or dead, gradually eroding the previously net positive capital positions of the living. Rational supervisory response is to put the zombies into the grave and drive a few stakes through the heart as well. Then and only then can the living prosper again.

The foregoing comments on the behavior of zombies is derived far more from my personal acquaintance with Prof. Edward Kane (Boston College) than from watching too many late-night horror movies.
What about loose Fed policy?
2 Thursday, 10 April 2008 15:40
???
Kane's argument doesn't mention Greenspan's loose monetary policy of recent years as a causal element of the crisis. Do you think this omission is because (1) he doesn't believe it contributed, or (2) he wanted to concentrate only on the regulatory issue? And if (1), why didn't it contribute, in his or your opinion?
Zombie Banks
1 Thursday, 10 April 2008 14:03
Ryan Goodenough
What are "zombie banks"? How did they come to be the way they are?

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